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Abstract. The stack-based access control mechanism plays a funda-
mental role in the security architecture of Java and Microsoft CLR
(common language runtime). It is enforced at runtime by inspecting
methods in the current call stack for granted permissions before the
program performs safety-critical operations. Although stack inspection
is well studied, there is relatively little work on automated generation
of access control policies, and most existing work on inferring security
policies assume the permissions to be checked at stack inspection points
are known beforehand. Practiced approaches to generating access control
policies are still manually done by developers based on domain-specific
knowledges and trial-and-error testing. In this paper, we present a sys-
tematic approach to automated generation of access control policies for
Java programs that necessarily ensure the program to pass stack inspec-
tion. The techniques are abstract interpretation based context-sensitive
static program analyses. Our analysis models the program by combining
a context-sensitive call graph with a dependency graph. We are hereby
able to precisely identify permission requirements at stack inspection
points, which are usually ignored in previous study.
1 Introduction
Access control is often the first step to protect safety-critical systems. In modern
Web platforms, such as Java-centric web applications or Microsoft .NET frame-
work, applications comprise components from different origins with diverse levels
of trust. A stack-based access control mechanism is employed in an attempt to
prevent untrusted codes from accessing protected resources. Access control poli-
cies are expressed in terms of permissions (e.g., a permission can be “writing
the file C:/students grades.txt”) that are granted to codes grouped by different
domains (e.g., www.jaist.ac.jp/faculty). Developers can set checkpoints through
the Java API CheckPermission(Permission) in their programs, and access control
is enforced dynamically at runtime by stack inspection. When stack inspection
is triggered, the current call stack will be inspected in a top-down manner, and
methods in the call stack are checked for granted permission. A caller can be
marked as privileged, and stack inspection stops at such a caller. If all callers
have the specified permission until a privileged method is found, access control
is passed and stack inspection returns quietly, otherwise the program execution
will be interrupted immediately.
Example 1 (Semantics of Java Stack Inspection). Consider the code snip-
pet in Fig. 1 that we borrow from [6] and modify it to make checkpoints of stack
inspections explicitly called and to make the analysis scenario more complicated.
There are two library classes Lib, Priv, and two application classes Faculty
and Student. At the beginning of program execution, Java VM assigns all classes
hereby methods in them to a set of permissions specified by a security policy. At
runtime, the two clients will require to connect to their corresponding domains by
creating a socket (Line 30 and 36, respectively). Such a request will trigger stack
inspection at Line 6 by the API AccessController.checkPermission(Permission)
which takes a single parameter of type Permission or its subclasses. Student is
required to posses the permission
perms : “SocketPermission(jaist.ac.jp/student:8080,connect)
′′
and Faculty is required to hold the permission
permf : “SocketPermission(jaist.ac.jp/faculty:8080, connect)
′′
.
Moreover, the socket construction process should be logged in C:/log.txt by
the system for later observation. A file access permission perma:“FilePermission
(C:/log.txt, write)” is required on the system to perform this task, hereby another
stack inspection is triggered at Line 24. Note that Student and Faculty reside
on the current call stack but should not posses perma. To avoid authorization
failures while logging, Lib invokes the API doPrivileged (Line 8) from the class
AccessController with passing an instance op of Priv, and by Java semantics,
op.run() will be executed with full permissions granted to its caller, and stack
inspection stops at checkConnect without requiring perma from clients of Lib.
Although stack inspection is well studied, there is relatively little work on au-
tomated generation of access control policies, and most existing work on inferring
security policies assume the permissions to be checked at stack inspection points
are known beforehand. Practiced approaches to generating access control policies
are still manually done by developers based on domain-specific knowledges and
trial-and-error testing. Since testing cannot cover all program runtime behaviors,
the application could malfunction due to accidental authorization failures given
a misconfigured policy. If a security policy is too conservative, i.e., some codes
are granted more permissions than necessary, it violates the PLP (Principle of
Least Privilege), and the codes become vulnerable points for malicious attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, the only existing analysis that attempted to
automatically identify authorization requirements and generate access control
policies for Java applications is [6]. As shown in Example 1, reasoning permissions
demands points-to analysis for identifying objects of Permission type, and string
analysis for resolving string parameters of relevant security APIs. As declaimed
in their paper, they are the first to combine access rights analysis with string-
analysis for deriving a precise security policy. The analysis consists in a context-
sensitive library analysis and a context-insensitive library-client analysis, being
tailored for effectively analysing production-level programs. It is not studied how
to resemble analysis results seamlessly in access rights analysis.
In this work, we present a systematic approach to automated generation of
access control policy for the given program that necessarily ensure it to pass stack
1 public class Lib {
2 private static f ina l St r ing d i r = ”C: ” ;
3 private static f ina l St r ing domain= ”JAIST .AC.JP” ;
4 public static void checkConnect ( S t r ing host , int port )
throws Exception {
5 SocketPermiss ion p1 = mkSocketPerm( host , port ) ;
6 Acces sCont ro l l e r . checkPermiss ion ( p1 ) ;
7 Priv op = new Priv ( d ir , l o gF i l e ) ;
8 Acces sCont ro l l e r . doPr iv i l eged ( op ) ;
9 }
10 public static Permiss ion mkSocketPerm( St r ing host , int port )
throws Exception {
11 St r ing hn = host +” : ”+port ;
12 SocketPermiss ion p2 = new SocketPermiss ion (hn , ” connect ” ) ;
13 return p2 ;
14 }
15 }
16 public class Priv implements Pr iv i l egedExcep t ionAct ion {
17 public Object run ( ) throws Exception {
18 St r ing name = ”/ l o g . t x t ” ;
19 St r ing fn = Lib . d i r + F i l e . s eparator + name . sub s t r i n g (1) ;
20 checkAccess ( fn ) ;
21 }
22 public void checkAccess ( S t r ing fn ) throws Exception {
23 Fi l ePermis s ion p3 = new Fi l ePermis s ion ( fn , ” wr i te ” ) ;
24 Acces sCont ro l l e r . checkPermiss ion ( p3 ) ;
25 }
26 }
27 public class Faculty {
28 public void connectFacu lty ( ) throws Exception {
29 St r ing host = Lib . domain . toLowerCase ( ) + ”/ f a c u l t y ” ;
30 Socket s = Lib . checkConnect ( host , 8080) ;
31 }
32 }
33 public class Student {
34 public void connectStudent ( ) throws Exception {
35 St r ing host = Lib . domain . toLowerCase ( ) + ”/ s tuden t ” ;
36 Socket s = Lib . checkConnect ( host , 8080) ;
37 }
38 }
Fig. 1. An Example for Java Stack Inspection
inspection. The techniques are abstract interpretation based (whole-program)
context-sensitive static program analysis. Our techniques consist in the following
new features.
(i) By defining a shared abstract interpretation of program calling contexts,
different context-sensitive analysis modules required in access rights anal-
ysis are glued in the same framework. The shared abstract program calling
contexts also enable us to generate permissions involved in the program
and identify permissions at stack inspection points, and hereby to generate
access control policies.
(ii) Our program model is based on context-sensitive call graph rather than
ordinary call graph. The analysis based on it handles dynamic features
of Java languages like late binding more precisely. The program model
is encoded as conditional weighted pushdown systems and the analysis
algorithm is yielded by model checking.
(iii) Our program model combines context-sensitive call graph with dependency
graph that essentially encodes data flow of permission objects. The reason
why call graph does not suffice is because permission objects can be created
and referred to anywhere in the program, by either accessing the heap,
i.e., field access, or by parameter passing of method calls that are finished
before stack inspection. In either case, the data flow of permission objects
is beyond the scope of the current call stack inspected by access control.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews conditional
weighted pushdown systems. Section 3 defines an abstraction interpretation of
program calling contexts. Section 5 presents permission generation. Section 6
formalizes the problem of access control policy generation. Section 7 gives re-
alization algorithms as model checking problems on conditional weighted push-
down systems. Section 8 discusses how to lift existing analysis to fit the analysis
framework. Section 9 discusses related work, and Section 10 concludes the paper.
2 Conditional Weighted Pushdown Systems
A pushdown system is a variant of pushdown automata without input alphabet.
Definition 1. A pushdown system P is (P, Γ,∆, p0, γ0), where P is a finite
set of control locations, Γ is a finite stack alphabet, ∆ ⊆ P × Γ × P × Γ ∗ is a
finite set of transitions, p0 ∈ P is the initial control location, and γ0 ∈ Γ is the
initial stack content. A transition (p, γ, q, ω) ∈ ∆ is written as 〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈q, ω〉.
A configuration is a pair 〈q, ω〉 with q ∈ P and ω ∈ Γ ∗. A set of configurations
C is regular if {ω | 〈p, ω〉 ∈ C} is regular. A relation ⇒ on configurations is
defined, such that 〈p, γω′〉 ⇒ 〈q, ωω′〉for each ω′ ∈ Γ ∗ if 〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈q, ω〉, and the
reflective and transitive closure of ⇒ is denoted by ⇒∗.
A pushdown system can be normalized by a pushdown system for which
|ω| ≤ 2 for each transition rule 〈p, γ〉 →֒ 〈q, ω〉 [16]. We omit p0 and γ0 when
they do not apply.
Definition 2. A bounded idempotent semiring S is (D,⊕, ⊗, 0¯, 1¯), where
0¯, 1¯ ∈ D, and
1. (D,⊕) is a commutative monoid with 0¯ as its unit element, and ⊕ is idem-
potent, i.e., a⊕ a = a for all a ∈ D;
2. (D,⊗) is a monoid with 1¯ as the unit element;
3. ⊗ distributes over ⊕, i.e., for all a, b, c ∈ D, we have
a⊗ (b⊕ c) = (a⊗ b)⊕ (a⊗ c) and (b⊕ c)⊗ a = (b ⊗ a)⊕ (c⊗ a);
4. for all a ∈ D, a⊗ 0¯ = 0¯⊗ a = 0¯;
5. A partial ordering ⊑ is defined on D such that a ⊑ b iff a ⊕ b = a for all
a, b ∈ D, , and there are no infinite descending chains in D.
By Def. 2, we have that 0¯ is the greatest element. From the standpoint of ab-
stract interpretation, PDSs model the (recursive) control flows of the program,
weight elements encodes transfer functions, ⊗ corresponds to the reverse of func-
tion composition, and ⊕ joins data flows. A weighted pushdown system (WPDS)
[15] is a generalized analysis framework for solving meet-over-all-path problems
for which data domains comply with the bounded idempotent semiring.
Definition 3. A weighted pushdown system W is (P ,S, f), where P =
(P, Γ,∆, p0, γ0) is a pushdown system, S = (D,⊕,⊗, 0¯, 1¯) is a bounded idempo-
tent semiring, and f : ∆→ D is a weight assignment function.
Let σ = [r0, ..., rk] with ri ∈ ∆ for 0 ≤ i ≤ k be a sequence of pushdown tran-
sition rules. A value associated with σ is defined by val(σ) = f(r0)⊗ ...⊗ f(rk).
Given c, c′ ∈ P × Γ ∗, we denote by path(c, c′) the set of transition sequences
that transform configurations from c into c′.
Definition 4. Given a weighted pushdown system W = (P ,S, f) where P =
(P, Γ,∆, p0, ω0), and regular sets of configurations S, T ⊆ P × Γ ∗, the meet-
over-all-path problem computes
MOVP(S, T ) = ⊕{val(σ) | σ ∈ path(s, t), s ∈ S, t ∈ T }
We refer MOVP(S, T ) by MOVP(S, T, W) when there are more than one
WPDS in the context. WDPSs are extended to Conditional WPDSs in [11], by
further associating each transition with regular languages that specify conditions
over the stack under which a transition can be applied.
Definition 5. A conditional pushdown system is Pc = (P, Γ,∆c, C, p0, γ0),
where P is a finite set of control locations, Γ is a finite stack alphabet, C is a
finite set of regular languages over Γ , ∆c ⊆ P ×Γ ×C×P ×Γ ∗ is a finite set of
transitions, p0 ∈ P is the initial control location, and γ0 ∈ Γ is the initial stack
content. A transition (p, γ, L, q, ω) ∈ ∆c is written as 〈p, γ〉
L
→֒ 〈q, ω〉. A relation
⇒c on configurations is defined such that 〈p, γω′〉 ⇒c 〈q, ωω′〉 for all ω′ ∈ Γ ∗
if there exists a transition r : 〈p, γ〉
L
→֒ 〈q, ω〉 and ω′ ∈ L . The reflecxive and
transitive closure of ⇒c is denoted by ⇒∗c .
Definition 6. A conditional weighted pushdown system Wc is a triplet
(Pc,S, f), where Pc = (P, Γ, C, ∆c, p0, γ0) is a conditional pushdown system,
S = (D,⊕,⊗, 0, 1) is a bounded idempotent semiring, and f : ∆c → D is a
weight assignment function.
We lift the model checking problem on WPDSs in Definition 4 to Condi-
tional WPDSs by replacing the underlying system from WPDSs to Conditional
WPDSs, and refer it by MOVP as well.
3 Abstract Interpretation of Calling Contexts
We denote by M the set of methods in a program, and by L the set of program
line numbers. Let CallSite ⊆ M × L denote the set of call sites, such that l
contains a method call for any (m, l) ∈ CallSite. In sequel, we will always use ζ
to range over CallSite.
Definition 7 (Call Graph). A call graph G = (N,E, s) is a directed graph,
where N ⊆ M is the set of nodes, E ⊆ M× CallSite×M is the set of edges,
and s ∈ N is the initial node with no incoming edges. We write n → n′ for
(n, ζ, n′) ∈ E, and →∗ is the transitive and reflexive closure of →. In particular,
ncheck ∈ N and npriv ∈ N denote the method checkPermission and doPrivileged
from the class AccessController, respectively.
The calling contexts of a method m, thereby local variables residing in the
method, is the set of (possibly infinite) sequences of call sites leading to m from
the program entry.
Definition 8 (Calling Contexts). By Context ⊆ CallSite∗ we denote pro-
gram calling contexts in terms of call site strings. Given a call graph G =
(N,E, s), the calling contexts of a method m is defined by φ :M→ 2Context:
φ(m) = {ζk . . . ζ1ζ0 ∈ Context | ∃k ∈ N : m0 = s,mk+1 = m,
(mi, ζi,mi+1) ∈ E, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k}
Given a finite set S = {s0, . . . , sk}, we denote by Π S the set of permutations
of S. For a word ω = si0si1 . . . sij ∈ S
∗ where 0 ≤ j ≤ k and 0 ≤ ij ≤ k, we
define Σ(ω) = {si0 , si1 , . . . , sij} to be the set of symbols that appear in ω.
Definition 9 (Abstract Calling Contexts). By AbsCtxt ⊆ 2CallSite we de-
note the abstract program calling contexts as sets of call sites appearing along
each call sequence.
– An abstraction function α : Context → AbsCtxt on calling contexts is de-
fined by, for c ∈ Context, α(c) = Σ(c), and an abstraction function α˜ :
2Context → 2AbsCtxt on sets of calling contexts is defined by, for c ⊆ Context,
α˜(c) = {Σ(ctxt) | ctxt ∈ c, and cs′ /∈ α˜(c) if cs′ ⊂ cs and cs ∈ α˜(c)}
– A concretization function γ : AbsCtxt → 2Context is defined by γ(C) =⋃
C′⊆C Π C
′ for C ∈ AbsCtxt, and the powerset extension of γ is denoted
by γ˜ : 2AbsCtxt → 2Context.
The abstract calling contexts of a method m is defined by a mapping φmeth :
M→ 2AbsCtxt, such that φmeth(m) = α˜(φ(m)).
Let ≤ be a binary relation over Context such that ctxt ≤ ctxt′ for any
ctxt, ctxt′ ∈ Context if Σ(ctxt) ⊆ Σ(ctxt′). We define c ≤ c′ for c, c′ ⊆ Context,
if for each ctext ∈ c, there exists ctext′ ∈ c′ such that ctext ≤ text′. It is not
hard to see that, for c ⊆ Context, cs ⊆ AbsCtxt, α˜(c) ⊆ cs iff c ≤ γ˜(cs), and we
can hereby conclude with Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. (2Context, α˜, γ˜, 2AbsCtxt) is a Galois connection. ⊓⊔
Example 2. Given a call graph G = (N,E, s) where N = {m1, . . . ,m4} and
E = {(mi, ζi,mi+1) | 1 ≤ i ≤ 3}∪{(m3, ζ4,m2), (m2, ζ5,m4)}. We have φ(m4) =
{ζ3(ζ2ζ4)∗ζ2ζ1, ζ2ζ1}, and φmeth(m4) = {{ζi | i = 1, . . . , 4}, {ζ1, ζ2}}. As shown
in this example, the design of α˜ concerns the situation of recursive calls.
4 The Analysis Framework
The overall structure of the analysis framework is shown in Figure 2. It consists
of analysis modules shown in rectangles. Context-sensitive string and points-to
analysis, call graph construction and dependency graph construction are pre-
assumed and defined in this section, and we discuss in Section 8 on how to
adapt the off-the-shelf algorithms to fit the analysis framework. The generation
of permissions and access control policies is given in the next sections. All analysis
modules in Figure 2 are glued by means of a shared abstraction interpretation
of program calling contexts given in Section 3. In the rest of the paper, we will
use Example 1 as a running example in all examples.
Definition 10 (Context-Sensitive Points-to Analysis). Given a reference
variable v of a method m, a context-sensitive points-to analysis, denoted by
pta(v),
(i) returns the finite set of abstract heap objects that v may refer to at runtime
under certain calling contexts; and
(ii) each object in pta(v) is represented as a triplet (Type, loc, c), where Type
is its runtime type, loc is its allocation site, and c ∈ φmethod(m) is the
calling contexts under which the object is allocated.
Definition 11 (Context-Sensitive String Analysis). Given a string vari-
able v of the method m, a context-sensitive string analysis, denoted by sa(v),
(i) returns the finite set of string constants that v may contain at runtime
under certain calling contexts; and
Fig. 2. The Overall Structure of the Analysis Framework
(ii) each element in sa(v) is represented as a pair (sv, c), where sv is the string
value and c ∈ φmeth(m) is the calling contexts under which sv is con-
structed.
Definition 12 (Context-Sensitive Call Graph). A context-sensitive call graph
Gcs = (G,φedge) consists of a call graph G = (N,E, s) and a mapping φedge :
E → 2AbsCtxt, such that for each node n ∈ N ,
– φedge(e) ⊆ φmeth(n) for each edge e = (n, ζ, n′) ∈ E;
–
⋃
e=(n,ζ,n′)∈E φedge(e) = φmeth(n).
We define a mapping φroute : (→∗)→ 2AbsCtxt by, for each n→i n′,
φroute(n→
i n′) =


φedge(n→ n′) if i = 1
{c ∪ c′ | ∃n′′ ∈ N : c ∈ φroute(n→i−1 n′′),
c′ ∈ φedge(n′′ → n′)} if i > 1
In Java, due to dynamic dispatch, the target method of a dynamic dispatch
depends on the runtime type of receiver objects. A precise call graph construction
computes virtual call targets separately for each calling contexts, and yields a
context-sensitive call graph. The calling contexts under which a call edge and a
call path is feasible are characterised by φedge and φroute in Def. 12, respectively.
An algorithm for possibly constructing Gcs is given in [11].
Definition 13 (Dependency Graph). Given a program in SSA (Static Single
Assignment) form. Let Tperm denote the class (or type) Permission or any of
its subclasses. Let Lalloc ⊆ L be the set of program lines that allocate objects of
Tperm, and let AllocPerm ⊆M×Lalloc.
A dependency graph Gdep of the program is a directed graph (Ndep, Edep, Sdep),
where Ndep ⊆M×L is the set of nodes, Edep ⊆ Ndep×Ndep is the set of edges,
Sdep = AllocPerm is the set of initial nodes with no incoming edges. Moreover,
Edep is the smallest set that contains (n, n
′) where n = (m, l) and n′ = (m′, l′)
if the variable of type Tperm defined in l is used in l
′.
We further denote by Einter ⊆ Edep the edges encoding (i) either statements
of method invocation that pass arguments of type Tperm or (ii) return statements
that return values of type Tperm.
s p1 = mkSocketPerm(...) p2 = expr1
connectFaculty checkPermission(p1) return p2
connectStudent checkConnect mkSocketPerm
npriv p3 = expr2
Priv.run() checkPermission(p3) ncheck
checkAccess
(1)
(2)
(6)
(10)
(3)
(4)
(8)
(7)
(5)
(9)
(11)(13)
(12)
(14)
Fig. 3. The Call Graph and Dependency Graph for Example 1
Example 3. The dependency graph and call graph of Example 1 is given in
Figure 3, where expr1 abbreviates “new SocketPermission(hn,“connect”)”, and
expr2 abbreviates “new FilePermission(fn, “write”)”. Rectangles and dashed
lines represent nodes and edges of dependency graph, respectively, and dotted
lines represent edges from Einter specifically. Rectangles with shadow and solid
lines represent nodes and edges of call graph, respectively. Dotted lines are used
to group nodes of call graph and dependency graph if they correspond to the
same method. Edges of both dependency graph and call graph are labelled with
numbers. We also label call sites following the labels of edges, such that an edge
(i) refers to (m, ζ(i),m
′) for some m and m′.
We show how to generate a context-sensitive call graph, i.e., φedge, given
points-to analysis. Since ncheck, npriv, checkConnect, and mkSocketPerm are
static methods, these methods can be always called. The program entry point
do not depend on previous calling contexts (that is empty) to dispatch a method
invocation. Therefore we have
φedge((i)) = ∅ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10}
Priv.run() is dynamically dispatched from line 8, depending on the runtime
type of object op. Given pta(op) = {(Priv, 7, {ζ(1), ζ(3)}), (Priv, 7, {ζ(2), ζ(4)})},
we have
φedge((8)) = {{ζ(1), ζ(3)}, {ζ(2), ζ(4)}}
φedge((9)) = {{ζ(1), ζ(3), ζ(8)}, {ζ(2), ζ(4), ζ(8)}}
5 Generating Permissions
All classes, hereby methods and program points, in a protection domain are
granted the same set of permissions. All methods belonging to the system do-
main, e.g., the method AccessController.doPrivileged, are granted all permissions.
Based on previously defined context-sensitive points-to and string analysis, we
show in this section how permissions that are possibly involved in the given pro-
gram are generated. The result is an over-approximation of exact permissions
appearing at runtime given sound string and points-to analysis.
Definition 14 (Access Control Policy). Let Domain denote the set of pro-
tection domains, and Perms denote the set of permissions. We denote by dom :
M → Domain the mapping from methods to their protection domains, and
perm : Domain → 2Perms the mapping that grants permissions to protection
domains. We define access control policy as a mapping policy : M→ 2Perms,
such that policy = perm ◦ dom.
By CheckPoint we denote call sites that directly call the method checkPer-
mission, i.e., CheckPoint = {ζ ∈ CallSite | ∃n ∈ N : (n, ζ, ncheck) ∈ E}. For
Example 1, CheckPoint = {(checkConnect, 6), (checkAccess, 24)}.
Let φperm : Perms → 2AbsCtxt be a mapping from permissions to the pro-
gram calling contexts under which permissions are generated. Perms and φperm
are generated as follows. Initially, Perms = ∅, and φperm = λx.∅. For each call
site (m, l) ∈ CheckPoint, l contains the expression “checkPermission(p)”. For
each (Type, loc, c) ∈ pta(p), the heap allocation site referred to by loc contains
expressions in one of the following form according to Java API specifications,
where npv is reference variable of type Tperm, target and action are string vari-
ables, and Type ∈ Tperm.

npv = new Type(target,action) (1)
npv = new Type(target) (2)
npv = new Type() (3)
We augment Perms with a permission perm in the form of
– “Type(sv1, sv2)” if (sv1, c1) ∈ sa(target), (sv2, c2) ∈ sa(action), and c1 = c2
for case (1), and let φperm(perm) = φperm(perm) ∪ {c1};
– “Type(sv)” if (sv, c′) ∈ sa(target) for case (2), and let φperm(perm) =
φperm(perm) ∪ {c′};
– “Type” for case (3), and let φperm(perm) = φperm(perm) ∪ φmethod(m′)
where m′ is the method that loc belongs to.
Example 4. Consider (checkConnect, 6) ∈ CheckPoint, we have
φmeth(checkConnect) = {{ζ(1), ζ(3)}, {ζ(2), ζ(4)}}
pta(p1) = {(SocketPermission, 12, c) | c ∈ φmeth(checkConnect)}
Then consider the allocation site at line 12, we have
sa(hn) = {(“jaist.ac.jp/student : 8080”, {ζ(2), ζ(4), ζ(5)})}
∪ {(“jaist.ac.jp/faculty : 8080”, {ζ(1), ζ(3), ζ(5)})}
sa(“connect”) = {(“connect”, {ζ(1), ζ(3), ζ(5)}), (“connect”, {ζ(2), ζ(4), ζ(5)})}
The following permissions can be generated
“perms : SocketPermission(“jaist.ac.jp/student : 8080”, “connect”)”
with φperm(perms) = {{ζ(2), ζ(4), ζ(5)}}, and
“permf : SocketPermission(“jaist.ac.jp/faculty : 8080”, “connect”)”
with φperm(permf ) = {{ζ(1), ζ(3), ζ(5)}}
Consider another check point (checkAccess, 24) ∈ CheckPoint, we can similarly
generate permissions
“perma : FilePermission(“C : /log.txt”, “write”)
with φperm(perma) = {{ζ(1), ζ(3), ζ(7), ζ(8)}, {ζ(2), ζ(4), ζ(7), ζ(8)}}
6 Problem Formalization
In this section, we fix a context-sensitive call graph Gcs = (G,φedge) where
G = (N,E, s), and a dependency graph Gdep = (Ndep, Edep, Sdep).
Definition 15 (Valid Call Paths). We define
– the set of call paths from s to a node n ∈ N by
path(n) = {e0e1 . . . ek | ∃k ∈ N : n0 = s, nk+1 = n,
ei = (ni, ζi, ni+1) ∈ E for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k}
– the set of call paths from s to n that are truncated by the node npriv as
tpath(n) = {e0e1e2 . . . ek | ∃k ∈ N : n0 = s, nk+1 = n, n0 →
∗ npriv,
e0 = (npriv, ζ0, n1), ei = (ni, ζi, ni+1) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k}
– the set of valid call paths from s to a node n ∈ N by
vpath(n) = {σ ∈ tpath(n) ∪ path(n) | ∃c ∈ φroute(σ) : c ⊆ sites(σ) and
σ /∈ vpath(n) if σ′ ∈ tpath(n) and σ′ is a suffix of σ}
where sites(σ) = {ζ0, . . . , ζk} for a call path σ = e0e1 . . . ek with ei =
(ni, ζi, ni+1) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k.
Example 5. Figure 3 consists of the following valid call paths from s to ncheck:
(1)(3)(6), (2)(4)(6), and ((8)(9)(10).
Definition 16 (Dependency Paths). We define the set of dependency paths
from Sdep to a node n ∈ Ndep by
dpath(n) = {e0e1 . . . ek | ∃k ∈ N : n0 ∈ Sdep, nk+1 = n,
ei = (ni, ni+1) ∈ Edep for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k}
and for each dependency path π,
extract(π) =
{
extract(e) if π = e ∈ Edep
extract(e)extract(π′) if π = eπ′ for some edge e ∈ Edep
where for each edge e = ((m, l), (m′, l′)) ∈ Edep,
extract(e) =


[(m,l) if (m, l) ∈ CallSite and e ∈ Einter
](m′,l′) if (m
′, l′) ∈ CallSite and e ∈ Einter
ǫ otherwise
For a valid call path σ = e0e1 . . . ek with ei = (ni, ζi, ni+1) for each 0 ≤
i ≤ k, we define meths(σ) = {mi,mi+1 | 0 ≤ i ≤ k}. For a dependency path
π = e′0e
′
1 · · · e
′
h where ei = ((mi, li), (mi+1, li+1)) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ h, we define
meths(π) = {mi,mi+1 | 0 ≤ i ≤ h}.
Definition 17 (Relate Valid Call Paths to Permissions). Given a depen-
dency path π = e0e1 · · · ek, where ei = ((mi, li), (mi+1, li+1)) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k.
Let σ = e′0e
′
1 · · · e
′
h ∈ vpath(m0) be a valid call path from s to m0, where e
′
i =
(m′i, ζi,m
′
i+1) with ζi = (m
′
i, l
′
i) for each 0 ≤ i ≤ h. Let ωl = [(m′0,l′0)· · · [(m′h,l′h),
and let wr = extract(π). We say π matches with σ if ωlωr is a well-matched
word (every symbol ](m,l) has a matched symbol [(m,l) before it in the word). The
set of all valid call paths that π matches with is denoted by match(π).
Given a valid call path σ ∈ vpath(ncheck) and a permission perm ∈ Perms.
We say σ relates to perm if there exists a dependency path π ∈ dpath(n) for
some n ∈ CheckPoint, and
(i) there exists a valid call path σ′ ∈ match(π) such thatmeths(σ) ⊆ meths(π)∪
meths(σ′) ∪ {ncheck}; and
(ii) there exists c ∈ φperm(perm) such that c ⊆ sites(σ′).
In Def. 17, π matches with σ means that π and σ jointly constitute a valid
inter-procedural data and control flow with respect to the permission allocated
at the initial node of π. By valid, we mean as usual that methods returns are
matched by method calls. Furthermore, if any calling context (i.e., the set of
call sites) for allocating a permission is consumed in σ matched with π, we
regard that π relates to the permission. We regard a valid call path σ′ relates
to a permission if the set of methods visited by σ′ is consumed in the valid
inter-procedural data and control flow with respect to that permission.
Definition 18 (Policy Generation). We define policy : M → 2Perms by,
for each valid call path σ ∈ vpath(ncheck), a permission perm ∈ Perm, and
m ∈ meths(σ), perm ∈ policy(m) if σ relates to perm.
Example 6. Consider the valid call path σ : (1)(3)(6) ∈ vpath(ncheck). For the
dependency path π : (11)(12)(13), match(π) = {σ′ : (1)(3)(5), σ′′ : (2)(4)(5)}
(ωl = [ζ(1) [ζ(3) [ζ(5) for σ
′, ωl = [ζ(2) [ζ(4) [ζ(5) for σ
′, and ωr =]ζ(5) for π). We have
meths(π) = {mkSocketPerm, checkConnect}
meths(σ′) = {s, connectFaculty, checkConnect,mkSocketPerm}
meths(σ) = {s, connectFaculty, checkConnect, ncheck}
and therefore meths(σ) ⊆ meths(σ′) ∪ meths(π) ∪ {ncheck}. Furthermore, by
Example 4, we have φpermf ⊆ sites(σ
′) = {ζ(1), ζ(3), ζ(5)}. By Definition 17 and
18, each method of meths(σ) holds permf . In this way we can precisely infer
that φperm(connectFactulty) = permf , φperm(connectStudent) = {perms}.
7 Generating Access Control Policy
Definition 19 (Modeling Context-Sensitive Call Graph). Given a context-
sensitive call graph Gcs = (G,φedge) where G = (N,E, s). We define a condi-
tional pushdown system Pc = ({·}, Γ, C, ∆c, {·}, s), where
– the set of control locations is a singleton {·};
– the stack alphabet Γ ⊆M∪ CallSite;
– we write α
C
→֒ ω for (·, α, C, ·, ω) ∈ ∆c. ∆c is constructed as follows, for each
edge e = (m, ζ,m′) ∈ E, we have
m
C(e)
→֒ m′ζ ∈ ∆c
where C(e) =
⋃
{γ0,··· ,γk}∈φedge(e)
⋃
{i0,··· ,ik}∈Π({0,...,k})
Γ ∗γi0Γ
∗ · · · γikΓ
∗.
In Def. 19, C(e) means that some calling context of the call edge in question
is contained in the current call stack.
Definition 20 (Modeling Dependency Graph). Give a dependency graph
Gdep = (Ndep, Edep, Sdep), we define a conditional pushdown system P ′c = ({·}, Γ, C
′,
∆′c), where ∆
′
c is constructed as follows, for each edge e = (n, n
′) ∈ Edep where
n = (m, l) and n′ = (m′, l′), we have
m
C(e)
→֒ ǫ ∈ ∆′c and (m
′, l′)
C(e)
→֒ m′ ∈ ∆′c
where C(e) = Γ ∗ if (m′, l′) ∈ CallSite.
Definition 21 (Program Modeling). We define a conditional pushdown sys-
tem Pprog = ({·}, Γ, Cprog, ∆prog, {·}, s) where, Cprog = C ∪ C′, and ∆prog =
∆c ∪∆
′
c, by combining Pc and P
′
c generated for Gcs and Gdep, respectively.
Definition 22 (Weight Domain).We define a bounded idempontent semiring
Sgen = (Dgen,⊕gen,⊗gen, 0¯, 1¯), where Dgen ⊆ 22
M×2M×2M×2CallSite ∪ {0¯}, and
1¯ = {(∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)}; and for any d, d′ ∈ Dm, d⊕gen d′ = d ∪ d′, and
d ⊗gen d
′ = {(M1 ∪M
′
1 \M
′
2,M2,M3 ∪M
′
3,M4 ∪M
′
4) |
(M1,M2,M3,M4) ∈ d, (M
′
1,M
′
2,M
′
3,M
′
4) ∈ d
′}
One can prove that both ⊗m and ⊕m are associative, and ⊕m is commutative
and distributive over ⊗m, which holds for a bounded idempontent semiring.
Definition 23 (Modeling Policy Generation).We define a conditional weighted
pushdown system Wgen = (Pprog,Sgen, fgen). For each transition rule δ ∈ ∆gen,
fgen(δ) is defined as follows,
– if δ is a push rule m
C
→֒ m′ζ,
{
fgen(δ) = {({m}, Γ, ∅, {ζ})}, if m = npriv;
fgen(δ) = {({m}, ∅, ∅, {ζ})}, otherwise
– if δ is a pop rule m
C
→֒ ǫ, fgen(δ) = {(∅, ∅, {m}, ∅)}.
– otherwise fgen(δ) = 1¯
Definition 24 (Algorithm for Generating Access Control Policy). Given
a conditional weighted pushdown system Wgen = (Pprog,Sgen, fgen) constructed
by Def. 23. We compute
result = MOVP({〈·, s〉}, T,Wprog)
where T = {〈·, ncheckω〉 | ω ∈ Γ ∗}.
(i) For any d = (M1,M2,M3,M4) ∈ result, and perm ∈ Perms, we say perm
is required by d if there exists c ∈ φperm(perm) such that c ⊆M4.
(ii) For each m ∈M1 \M3, perm ∈ policy(m) if perm is required by d.
For each d computed in Def. 24,M4 is the calling history in terms of call sites
of valid inter-procedural data flows constituted by call paths and dependency
paths; M1 contains methods that reside on call paths truncated by npriv; M2
is supposed to be ∅ by our modeling, because npriv can never be the initial
node of call graph, and M3 contains finished called methods that do not reside
on the current call stack. Therefore M1 \M3 contains methods residing on the
current call stack before a privileged method. The algorithm for generating access
control policy precisely corresponds to principles in Def. 17. The soundness of
our analysis is straightforward given the abstract interpretation in Section 3.
Example 7. By Def. 19, we have
∆c = {δi : mi
C(e)
→֒ m′i ζ(i), | e : (mi, ζ(i),m
′
i), 1 ≤ i ≤ 10}
By Def. 20, we have
∆′c = {δ : mkSocketPerm
C
→֒ ǫ, δ′ : ζ(5)
C
→֒ checkConnect}
that is encoded from the edge (12) of dependency graph, where C = Γ ∗.
We have the following weights for transitions,

fgen(δ8) = {({npriv}, Γ, ∅, {ζ(8)})}
fgen(δ) = {(∅, ∅, {mkSocketPerm}, ∅)}
fgen(δ
′) = 1¯
fgen(δi) = {({mi}, ∅, ∅, {ζ(i)})} for i ∈ {1, . . . , 10} \ {8}
By Def. 24, we compute result = {d1, d2, d3, d4}, where

d1 = (M1, ∅, {mkSocketPerm}, {ζ(i) | i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 6}})
where M1 = {s, connectFaculty, checkConnect,mkSocketPerm}
d2 = (M1, ∅, {mkSocketPerm}, {ζ(i) | i ∈ {2, 4, 5, 6}})
where M1 = {s, connectStudent, checkConnect,mkSocketPerm}
d3 = (Priv.run, checkAccess}, ∅, ∅, {ζ(i) | i ∈ {2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10}})
d4 = (Priv.run, checkAccess}, ∅, ∅, {ζ(i) | i ∈ {1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10}})
We have that permf is required by d1, perms is required by d2, and perma
is required by d3 and d4. We can further infer permissions possessed by each
method by (ii) of Def. 24.
8 Discussions
8.1 Context-Sensitive Points-to and String Analysis
Context-sensitive points-to and string analysis play a crucial role in our analysis
framework. It is not hard to adapt the existing analysis to fit our needs.
It is direct to adapt static analysis by WPDSs to our setting, because WPDSs
have the advantage of handling data flow queries as regular languages of push-
down configurations, and regular stack configurations naturally encode our ab-
straction of calling contexts. For instance, for each reference variable v of the
method m, we can compute pta(v) =
⋃
Tctxt
MOVP(S, Tctxt) where S is the source
configurations, and Tctxt = {〈v,mω〉 | Σ(ω) ⊆ ctxt} for each ctxt ∈ φmethod(m).
To adapt cloning-based analysis to our needs, we can turn to the following
approach that is line with context-cloning: given a call graph G = (N,E, s) (or
graphs which product with call graph as the starting point of the analysis). We
construct another graph Gclone = (Nclone, Eclone), where Nclone ⊆ 2AbsCtxt ×N
is the set of nodes, Eclone ⊆ Nclone×CallSite×Nclone is the set of edges, and we
have (i) (c, n) ∈ Nclone for c ∈ φmethod(n), and n ∈ N ; and (ii) ((c, n), (c
′, n′)) ∈
Eclone if c ⊆ c′ and (n, n′) ∈ E for (c, n), (c′, n′) ∈ Nclone.
One obtains context-sensitive analysis by applying context-insensitive analy-
sis to Gclone, e.g., the points-to analysor Spark [10] can be adapted by cloning its
points-to graph in this manner, and string analysor JSA (Java String Analyzer)
[5] can be lifted to a context-sensitive analysis of our framework by cloning its
front-end flow graph, with no need to modify the back-end analysis engine.
8.2 Policy Checking
Another popular need in access rights analysis is checking whether the program
function properly given an access control policy, e.g., codes from trusted do-
mains always pass access control or may fail. The answer can either help detect
redundant inspection points or refine the given policies.
One approach to policy checking is first generating an access control policy as
described before, and then check whether the given policy consumes the required
policy. Formally, given a policy : M → 2Perms and a policy′ : M → 2Perms
generated by Def.18. Stack inspection triggered in the program always succeed
if policy′(m) ⊆ policy(m) for each m ∈M, and may fail otherwise.
However, one problem for this approach is that, we may reject a benign
security policy if it is more precise than the generated one. After all, the access
control policy automatically generated is an over-approximation of the minimal
policy by sound static analysis.
Instead of generating the minimal policy in advance, an alternative is to check
on-demand at stack inspection points whether all methods in the current call
stack are granted required permissions. The two approaches to policy checking
are in line with the two ways of implementing stack inspection mechanism by
virtual machines in an either eager or lazy manner.
9 Related Work
From the theoretical aspect, Banerjee et al. in [1] gived a denotational seman-
tics and hereby proved the equivalence of eager and lazy evaluation for stack
inspection. They further proposed a static analysis of safety property, and also
identified program transformations that help remove redundant runtime access
control checks. The problem to decide whether a program satisfies a given policy
properties via stack inspection, was proved intractable in general by Nitta et
al. in [12]. They showed that there exists a solvable subclass of programs which
precisely model programs containing checkPermission of Java 2 platform. More-
over, the study concluded the computational complexity of the problem for the
subclass is linear time in the size of the given program.
Chang et al. [4] provided a backward static analysis to approximate redun-
dant permission checks with must-fail stack inspection and success permission
checks with must-pass stack inspection. This approach was later employed in a
visualization tool of permission checks in Java [8]. But the tool didn’t provide
any means to relieve users from the burden of deciding access rights. In addi-
tion to a policy file, users were also required to explicitly specify which methods
and permissions to check. Two control flow forward analysis, Denied Permission
Analysis and Granted Permission Analysis, were defined by Bartoletti et al. [2]
[3] to approximate the set of permissions denied or granted to a given Java byte-
code at runtime. Outcome of the analysis were then used to eliminate redundant
permission checks and relocate others to more proper places in the code.
Koved et al. in [9] proposed a context-sensitive, flow-sensitive, and context-
sensitive (1-CFA) data flow analysis to automatically estimate the set of access
rights required at each program point. In spite of notable experimental results,
the study suffered from a practical matter, as it does not properly handle strings
in the analysis. Being a module of privilege assertion in a popular tool – IBM
Security Workbench Development for Java (SWORD4J) [7], the interprocedural
analysis for privileged code placement [14] tackled three neat problems: iden-
tifying portions of codes that necessary to make privileged, detecting tainted
variables in privileged codes, and exposing useless privileged blocks of codes, by
utilizing the technique in [9].
In aforementioned works, they all assume permissions required at every check-
Permission(perm) point. That is, they either ignored or employed limited compu-
tation of String parameters. Correspondingly, the access rights analysis become
too conservative, e.g., many false alarms may be produced in policy checking.
To the best of our knowledge, the modular permission analysis proposed in
[6] is the most relevant to our work . On one hand, it was also concerned with
automatically generating security polices for any given program, with particular
attention on the principle of least privilege. On the other hand, they were the first
to attempt to reflect the effects of string analysis in access rights analysis in terms
of slicing. A modular analysis algorithm is proposed to achieve the practical
scalability, and the authors developed a tool Automated Authorization Analysis
(A3) to assess the precision of permission requirements for stack inspection.
However, their algorithms are based on a context-insensitive call graph and the
analysis results can be polluted by invalid call paths. Moreover, their slicing
algorithms are also context-insensitive.
10 Conclusions
We have presented a systematic approach to automated generation of access
control policies for a given Java program. The techniques are abstract interpre-
tation based context-sensitive static program analysis. We define an abstract
interpretation on program calling contexts, and all analysis modules required in
access rights analysis are hereby glued together in an unified analysis framework.
Given such an abstract interpretation, we generate permissions that are possibly
involved in access rights analysis. In our analysis, the program is modelled by
combining a context-sensitive call graph with a dependency graph of the target
program and we are therefore able to precisely identify permission requirements
at checkpoints of stack inspection. We expect a good precision of our analysis
due to its context-sensitive nature. A public tool that can automatically gen-
erating security policies for Java applications doesn’t exist so far. It would be
interesting to put the analysis techniques proposed in the paper into practice
by settling scalability. As the first step, we are implementing an efficient model
checking algorithm for Conditional WPDSs, tailored for algorithms presented in
the paper. Although stack inspection is widely adopted as a simple and practical
model in stack-based access control, it has a number of inherent flaws, e.g., an
unauthorized code which is no longer in the call stack may be allowed to affect
the execution of security-sensitive code. A worth highlighting alternate model is
IBAC (Information-based Access Control) proposed by Pistoia et al. in [13] for
programs. It would be interesting to extend the analysis framework to analyse
IBAC security policy.
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